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Abstract
The Egyptian military regime of Abd al-Fattah el-Sisi has announced as part of its Vision 2030 its
intention to eliminate informal urban areas. The regime has identified these areas – commonly
known by the Arabic term ‘ashwa’iyyat (which means haphazard) – as a threat to the nation. The
Egyptian state, however, has no clear conception of what urban informality constitutes or what
exactly it is eradicating. To understand how and why the state has placed urban informality as cen-
tral to its politics, I contend that we have to examine the political processes through which this
uncertain yet powerful concept is produced. Urban informality, I argue, is a political intervention
that is always fleeting and geographically specific in an otherwise haphazard context. Haphazard
urbanisation points to the complex power struggles by a range of actors, both within and beyond
the state, through which the formal and informal divide can mark urban life. In a critical reading of
the first major study of informality in Egypt, I show how the urban was divided into the formal
and informal through outdated laws. I detail, by engaging sources in English and Arabic, how the
Egyptian state militarised urban informality from the 1990s onwards. I argue that it is through this
historical framing that we must understand el-Sisi’s current war against urban informality. In turn,
I argue that the regime’s attempt to eliminate informality has not resulted in greater control over
what and how urban informality appears but has deepened the hazardisation of urban life.
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Introduction
Since taking power in 2013, the Abd al-
Fattah el-Sisi military regime in Egypt has
placed urban informality as a political prior-
ity. As part of the regime’s Egypt Vision
2030 and tailored to the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs), detailed in ela-
borately created promotional videos such as
‘A Smile of Hope’ (notably posted by the
Ministry of Defence and produced by the
Egyptian Armed Forces), the Egyptian state
has announced its intention to ‘eliminate’
informal urban areas.1 The executive direc-
tor of the Informal Settlements
Development Fund (ISDF) told Daily News
Egypt that ‘By 2030, Egypt will be com-
pletely slum-free, and all unplanned areas
will have improved, in addition to all infor-
mal markets. In 2030, Egypt will be
reshaped’ (Moneam, 2018). The Sisi state
has identified ‘informal’ urban areas –
denoted in Egypt in both official and popu-
lar discourse by the Arabic term
‘ashwa’iyyat (the plural of ‘ashwa’iy, which
means haphazard) – as a central threat to
the state. The Egyptian media has widely
reported the Sisi state’s ‘major war’ against
the spread of informal settlements that are
cited to be incubators of extremists and ter-
rorists (Sabahy, 2020; Tamraz, 2019). The
newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat stated that
even with the economic challenges that the
coronavirus has brought to the Egyptian
government, it has continued to focus on its
plans to address the ‘ashwa’iyyat that it con-
siders to be among ‘the most important
issues troubling society and linking poverty
to terrorism’ (Hassanen, 2020).2
To understand how and why the
Egyptian state has placed the concept of
urban informality as central to its political
agenda and as a threat to the state, we have
to interrogate and reconceptualise this term
and trace its historical geographical emer-
gence in Egypt and beyond. In the first sec-
tion of this article, I outline contemporary
debates on urban informality in both Egypt
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and beyond. I argue that urban informality
is a political intervention and its appearance
is always fleeting and geographically specific
in an otherwise haphazard context. I under-
stand the appearance of urban informality
not as the border of an object or a mode of
urbanisation but as a complex power rela-
tionship articulated through an unstable
political process. Haphazard urbanisation
points to the complex power struggles by a
range of actors that make up the urban
landscape and cannot be divided neatly into
the formal and informal without the applica-
tion of an (always contested) power.3 To
understand the appearance of urban inform-
ality and its consequences requires that we
trace the political processes through which
this concept emerged and is maintained.
In the second section, I contend that the
appearance of urban informality in Egypt
followed shifts in geopolitical relations. I
detail how the specific concept of urban
informality was introduced into the
Egyptian context by the World Bank and
USAID in a period of intense geopolitical
transformation at a range of geographical
scales. I focus on a 1982 World Bank-funded
report that I contend was key to introducing
the idea of Egypt being defined by urban
informality through the use of outdated and
incomplete laws. I note how this same study
ignored its own documentation of haphazard
urban processes and instead categorised the
country as being dominated by informality.
In the final section of this article, I
account for why urban informality, despite
its variable definitions and contested forma-
tions, has emerged as a mainstay to the poli-
tics of the el-Sisi military state and resulted
in the hazardisation of the urban fabric. The
state in Egypt, as part of a global military
trend that meaningfully began in the 1990s,
militarised urban informality. It is through
this historical and analytical frame that the
importance that the el-Sisi military state has
placed upon urban informality should be
understood. I stress, however, that while the
regime has made a concerted effort to enact
policies to eliminate urban informality this
has not meant it has the ability to do so.
Despite the ever-increasing social repression
by the military state in Egypt it does not act
in a social vacuum, and while it may be able
to conduct singular and dramatic acts in
shaping the built environment, the state’s
intervention is also characterised by hapha-
zard negotiations at a range of geographical
scales over who can live where and how,
what is legal and illegal and the formal and
informal in urban Egypt.
This analysis is part of my own continued
research on urban dynamics in Egypt since I
lived in the country in 2006–2007 and made
subsequent visits in 2012 and 2017–2018.
This article relies on an examination of both
English and Arabic archival documents of
state laws and decrees, human rights organi-
sations reports, NGOs (like 10Tooba
Applied Research on the Built Environment)
and media (Egyptian and international media
and social media). This article consists of a
critical reading of the 1982 Abt Association
study on Informal Housing in Egypt. This
report is widely understood by scholars of
urban Egypt to be among the first official
publications to introduce the terminology of
urban informality into the country.
Urban informality and power in a
haphazard context
In my framing of urban informality, I con-
tend that urban studies scholars should dis-
tinguish between the political process that
can produce the appearance of a formal and
informal divide and the everyday haphazard
urban practices that characterise urban life. I
understand urban informality not as the bor-
der of an object or a mode of urbanisation
but the fleeting and geographically specific
outcome of a power relationship. Anything
can be framed as formal or informal; it
Sharp 3
requires the application of a durable struc-
ture of power to achieve this appearance.
The el-Sisi regime would like to show that it
has the ability to determine what is formal
and what is not, and what forms of informal-
ity will thrive and which will disappear. But
the historical-geographical record of inform-
ality in Egypt shows a more contested, con-
tradictory and complex set of practices.
Urban informality is foremost a political
process, enacted at a range of geographical
scales, that is always fleeting and geographi-
cally specific in a haphazard context.
The declared goal by el-Sisi to clear Egypt
of the ‘ashwa’iyyat and ‘eliminate’ informal
areas is startling given the state’s under-
standing of the extent of it in Egypt. Urban
informality is often deemed to be – by aca-
demics, policy makers and the state – the
‘dominant mode of urbanization’ in Egypt
(Séjourné, 2009: 17). In 2013, the Informal
Settlement Development Fund (ISDF), one
of the state bodies tasked with overseeing
the mapping and classification of informal
areas, estimated that informal areas make of
76% of urban areas, with 16 million inhabi-
tants (cited in Khalil, 2021: 354). Urban
informality it seems is everywhere in Egypt,
yet at the same time what it actually refers to
is opaque. There are many different classifi-
cations of urban informality made by the
Egyptian state, including: aesthetic consid-
erations (i.e. unpainted bricks); classification
of land; location; settlement mechanism
(squatting versus illegal purchasing) and
process (individual versus collective); a large
array of different laws; connection to basic
urban services; and considerations of health
and safety (see Khalil, 2021; Shawkat, 2020).
The Egyptian state does not have a singular
coherent conception of what and/or where
urban informality is (ElGamal, 2017; Sabry,
2009: 29). However, it is not only state enti-
ties that have competing and ambiguous
categories of the constitution of urban
informality; academics have been no more
successful in producing coherent conceptions
of urban informality in Egypt or beyond.
Several scholars and policy makers view
informal urbanism to be the major mode of
urban design and development over the past
50 years throughout the global south; more
recent scholarship has also sought to show its
presence in the global north. There have been
many contemporary overviews of the rapidly
expanding literature on urban informality
(see e.g. Acuto et al., 2019; Harris, 2018;
McFarlane, 2019; Marx and Kelling, 2019;
Waibel and McFarlane, 2012). Informality
studies now comprises a large cross-
disciplinary literature that stresses the highly
variegated types of informality that exist
within and across countries around the world,
its applicability to all income groups, the
importance of practice and the complex rela-
tionships that exist between and within the
informal and the formal, as well as the signifi-
cance of the broader frameworks of social
power – specifically, the state, its legal frame-
work and the market – in what gets framed
as informal. While urban informality is now
considered to be ubiquitous by both scholars
and policy makers, there is little agreement
over what it actually means. Urban informal-
ity has remained an elusive term.
The volume of scholarship on informality
and the wide range of different contexts and
things to which it refers has led to some aca-
demics questioning how analytically useful
the distinction between informal and formal
is and to the need to search for a more spe-
cific urban grammar (McFarlane, 2019).
Herrle and Fokdal (2011: 7) have declared
urban informality to be a myth due to its
ever-changing formations and vague formu-
lations. Accepting this idea, however, would
tell us little about why the Egyptian military
state has been so preoccupied with this term
and has directed great resources in efforts to
‘eradicate’ it or why urban studies scholars
have spilt considerable ink trying to come to
terms with it. Urban informality is a
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framework that plays an important role in
directly shaping the urban order and strug-
gles within it – at times to devastating effect.
The formal and informal urban divide does
political work that we need a better under-
standing of. Specifically, how and why
urban informality has emerged as central to
politics, to what end and its impact on the
built environment and urban social life.
Drawing on Mitchell’s (1991) argument in
relation to the state, I contend that the elu-
siveness of urban informality should tell us
something about this concept. Rather than
dismissing urban informality as a myth or
responding to this accusation by searching
for a more specific or fixed definition, we
need to examine the political processes
through which this uncertain yet powerful
concept is produced. My analysis of urban
informality contributes to the call by Marx
and Kelling (2019: 499) to be attentive to
how and why informal distinctions emerge
and the social processes that underly what
comes to be identified as informal. In this
article, I outline how the World Bank intro-
duced urban informality into Egypt in the
late 1970s using outdated and colonial laws
and the broader geopolitical framework that
this was situated within. In turn, I show how
the Egyptian state was reluctant to utilise the
term urban informality until the 1990s when
the military state sought to link the Islamist
‘threat’ to it. It is these political contexts that
we should be attentive to in understanding
both the ubiquity of the elusive term of urban
informality in Egypt and its power.
The scholarship of Roy (2005, 2009,
2018) has been particularly influential in the-
orising urban informality. Roy (2005)
defines urban informality as a mode of urba-
nisation, an organising logic, a system of
norms that governs the process of urban
transformation.4 In this framing, urban
informality is a mode of power and disci-
pline: ‘informality exists at the very heart of
the state and is an integral part of the
territorial practices of state power’ (Roy,
2009: 84). In recent years, there has been a
collective scholarly effort led by Roy’s
(2005, 2009, 2018) writings to interrogate
the complex political relationship between
urban informality and the state (Beier, 2021;
Bénit-Gbaffou, 2018; Haid and Hilbrandt,
2019). Haid and Hilbrandt (2019: 555–557),
for instance, have argued that we need to
understand the porosity of the state itself
and the heterogeneity of practices that con-
stitute it; this includes diversity within the
state, the different geographical scales that
comprise the state and the conflicting politi-
cal interests within it and the impact of insti-
tutions beyond the state (i.e. international
organisations or NGOs). This article is a
contribution to theorisations of urban
informality that aim to be more attentive to
the intricate political struggles that underlie
the production and durability of this con-
cept. I understand the appearance of urban
informality not as the border of an object or
a mode of urbanisation but as a complex
power relationship articulated through an
unstable political process.
Urban Egypt is not dominated by urban
informality on one side and urban formality
on another, but by haphazard urbanisation in
which anything can be made to appear formal
or informal if there is the will and power to do
so. Haphazard urbanisation points to the com-
plex social negotiation between a large array
of networks through which the urban is prac-
tised and formed. To create the appearance of
a formal and informal divide in this haphazard
context, power has to be mobilised, produced
and composed. It has to be a power that is not
automatically achieved but the result of a pro-
cess that is always open to a range of out-
comes, and one that is always geographically
and temporally specific. As I detail below in
the case of Al-Warraq Island, even in the
highly authoritarian context of Egypt the abil-
ity to produce this power, to create the appear-
ance of divides between the formal and
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informal, can be resisted and transformed.
Due to the contested process of creating the
appearance of a formal and informal divide,
scholars should also be attentive to how this
political process can result in putting urban
collective life in danger – its hazardisation.
The appearance of urban informality
Even before the concept of urban informal-
ity began to be used by scholars in the 1970s
(for a history of the term, see Harris, 2018),
who could live where and how occupied a
notable place in Egyptian politics. Before
the 1952 Revolution, or coup d’état, a series
of British and French colonial codes and
regulations guided Egypt’s urban planning
and design. Following the revolution,
Gamal Abd al-Nasser’s government was
keen to replace these colonial rules. A com-
plex social struggle ensued between Nasser,
various parts of the state and private land-
owners over who was allowed to build shel-
ter, and where and how. As the Nasserite
government focused on industrialisation,
and the construction of factories and indus-
tries, it mostly took a hands-off approach to
how most Egyptians achieved shelter
(Hassan, 1978). The government often pro-
duced new legal frameworks and amnesties
at politically notable moments, such as the
1956 Presidential elections or the conflict of
1967 (Shawkat, 2020). The specific appear-
ance of the formal and informal divide in
Egypt as a policy framework and political
device, I contend, arose in the crucial period
of 1967–1973 and its aftermath.
The war of 1967 had a dramatic impact
on the urbanisation process in Egypt as the
country focused its resources on the conflict.
The war economy resulted in a fast-paced
extension and intensification of urbanisa-
tion. Higher-income groups sought safety
for their assets and ploughed money into
land (prices doubled from 1967 to 1972) and
the government abandoned the construction
of subsidised housing (Néfissa, 2009;
Shawkat, 2020). This trend of rising land
prices and decreased subsidised housing was
continued following the end of the October
1973 war and President Sadat’s announce-
ment of the Infitah (the Open-Door Policy).
Sadat’s famous 1974 October paper
announced the construction of several new
desert cities around Cairo. The government
claimed they would release pressure from
the centre of the city. Desert cities would
act, and continue to do so, for the Egyptian
state as the objects on which they would try
to fix a formal definition of the built envi-
ronment (one with physical characteristics)
and reinforce the appearance of the formal
and informal divide in the country (see e.g.
Khalil, 2021). Despite the continued con-
struction of these desert cities from Sadat to
the current regime of Sisi, vast amounts of
housing within these desert cities for the
most part lie uninhabited (Shawkat, 2020:
161).
The state has never had complete control
over what, how and where shelter, and
urban social life along with it, emerges. In
the Sadat period, the formation of the built
environment was impacted not only by the
conflict occupying the state but also by the
1973 oil crisis. This period resulted in the
rise of the oil-rich Gulf monarchies and
meant many Egyptians of all classes went to
work and sent remittances back home. The
preferred investment for surplus capital from
remittances was land, bricks and mortar
(Sims, 2010). As a result, land prices contin-
ued to rise and real estate emerged as a cen-
tral component of the economy.
Remittances make a notable contribution to
Egypt’s economy and according to the
World Bank accounted for US$24 billion in
2020, amounting to 6.7% of GDP. This con-
tributed to the haphazard urbanisation pro-
cess and the appearance of a formal and
informal divide – but one that requires fur-
ther scholarly investigation.
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The Infitah turned Egypt away from the
Soviet Union and towards the West, allow-
ing for greater foreign investment and for
Egyptians to travel more freely abroad. It
shifted government policy to a more con-
certed intervention by the state, elites and
western organisations, into the built environ-
ment. It was in this period that western insti-
tutions, such as the World Bank, entered
Egypt and entities with existing relation-
ships, like USAID, expanded and began to
directly advise the Egyptian government on
how to deal with the housing question. It
was also in this period that the formal and
informal divide emerged as a tool to attempt
to organise the built environment. Sadat
signed the Camp David Accords in 1978 and
this had significant implications for the
shape and form of urbanisation, and in par-
ticular for the divide between the legal and
the illegal and for the appearance of the for-
mal and the informal.
Months before Sadat’s assassination in
1981 by Islamist militants, associated with
al-Jihad, the government issued an amnesty
on demolitions of illegal buildings in parallel
to a range of new laws imposing tighter con-
trol and punishment of buildings constructed
without a permit (Shawkat, 2020: 41).
Funding by the US, directly and through its
parastatals, was significantly increased to
Egypt in the run-up to and after the Accords
in 1978 and further again following the
assassination of Sadat; mass housing pro-
grammes and aided self-help schemes
received notable support. CIA archival
records detail how Washington feared
Sadat’s vulnerability to urban insurrection
and sought to reform Egypt’s urban admin-
istration (Dorman, 2013: 1593). The World
Bank and USAID wanted the Egyptian gov-
ernment to shift their current policy
approach to the urban poor from neglect to
active engagement through identifying
‘informal settlements’, creating appropriate
legislation, construction of infrastructure
and ‘aided self-help’ – or what the World
Bank called ‘site and services’.
From the 1970s onwards, the World
Bank actively sought to identify ‘informal’
settlements and encourage governments to
facilitate the legalisation (formalisation) of
these shelters and allow the urban poor to
find their own housing solutions (Harris,
2003). The US in the Cold War era viewed
mass homeownership, and specifically aided
self-help, as a mechanism through which to
expand an American model of capitalism
and protect its geopolitical interests. Kwak
(2015: 89) argues that American housing
advisors who began urging countries around
the world to embrace mass homeownership
embraced the idea of aided self-help ‘for its
quintessentially capitalist, anticommunist
ethos’.
Sakr (1990), a senior planner in the
General Organization for Physical Planning
(GOPP) who worked on the first World
Bank-sponsored studies on informal settle-
ments, notes in her PhD thesis that the
World Bank and USAID were the first to
frame the housing crisis in Egypt as one
centred specifically around informality and
to suggest solutions to the Egyptian govern-
ment on how to address it. The Bank and
USAID, Sakr (1990: 5) notes, took a two-
phased approach, a one-year study phase
(1977–1978) and a four-year implementation
phase (1978–1982): ‘These projects repre-
sented the first attempt in Egypt to explicitly
acknowledge the unauthorized self-help
activities taking place in informal areas’.
The 1982 Abt Associates study, Informal
Housing in Egypt, financed by USAID and
supported by the World Bank, and underta-
ken with the General Organization for
Housing, Building and Planning Research
(GOHBPR), is the central study of this
period that explicitly sought to assess the
level of urban informality in Egypt. The
release of this study was also accompanied
by the announcement of a new planning law
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that attempted to synthesise the fragmentary
body of urban planning laws in the country
(Elkhishin, 1997). The Abt Associates study
recorded high levels of informality, noting
that 84% of all housing in Cairo and 91%
in Beni Suef (a city south of Cairo) between
1970 and 1981 was informal. But the authors
also noted that (unlike in Latin America)
squatting made up only a small share of
informal housing. While the Abt document
reported that definitions of informal housing
fluctuated in Egypt, it defined informality in
the study in relation to the legal system.
Informal housing in the Abt report was
considered to be on land that is illegally sub-
divided in contravention of Law 52 of 1940
or that violates building regulations.5 It is
curious that the study took Law 52 to define
urban informality because, as the authors
note: ‘According to planning officials inter-
viewed, this law has been ineffective since
enactment ... once neighbourhoods are
established in illegal subdivisions, the law is
virtually impossible to enforce’ (Abt
Associates with Dames and Moore, General
Organization for Housing, Building, and
Planning Research, 1982). The authors omit
the fact that this was a colonial law or the
implications that using an ineffective and
unenforceable law may have on their assess-
ments of urban informality. The sheer num-
ber of settlements that violated Law 52 and
building codes meant that this classification
of urban informality constituted a wide vari-
ety of different settlements, ages, security
statuses, classes and infrastructural provi-
sions (many areas classified as ‘informal’
had access to basic urban services in line
with city-wide averages). But the Abt report
neglects the significance of the complex
negotiations and active planning between
various state institutions (in particular
between central and local government),
within the legal system, as well as between
various stakeholders over the different prop-
erties it clumps together as informal. This is
even though the authors detail in the report,
if one reads carefully, intricate practices of
haphazard urbanisation in the implementa-
tion and organisation of the urban
communities.
The Abt report, on the one hand, does
carefully detail the intricate political strug-
gles that went on in claims to the ownership
of dwellings. But on the other hand, the
authors insist on the appearance of a formal
and informal urban divide. For instance, the
report cites ‘informal’ land registration being
undertaken to transfer land. This entails a
seller going to court and alleging partial
non-payment from the buyer. The court then
charges the buyer in writing and issues a
court order, and the buyer pays and receives
a receipt from the seller – once the buyer has
finished the house, they then register it with
the local district. The report details many
other instances like this, including: a group
of residents due to be displaced through a
stipulation in Law 52/1940 over the width of
a road who won from the courts the right to
remain; and a resident who received a fine
from a police officer and then used this same
fine to gain recognition as the owner of the
property. Even the government, the Abt doc-
ument reported, fell afoul of laws relating to
illegal subdivision, but it negotiated a ‘for-
mal’ outcome. The report adds that, in the
provision of infrastructure, ‘once informal
housing areas are spatially consolidated and
represent permanent residential communities
and residents collectively request government
recognition, formal provision of infrastructure
may be forthcoming’ (Abt Associates with
Dames and Moore, General Organization for
Housing, Building, and Planning Research,
1982). Notably, as Shawkat (2020: 190) has
detailed, these practices continue to this day;
Shawkat also cites similar levels of informality
being officially reported in Egypt 40 years
after the Abt study. Despite the Abt report
detailing haphazard urban processes – an
array of complex social negotiations between
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a large array of networks through which the
urban is practised – it insisted on the appear-
ance of an urban scene divided into the formal
and the informal.
The Abt report was accompanied by the
World Bank and USAID prompting the
Egyptian government to implement upgrading
projects in ‘informal’ areas and to abandon
the construction of subsidised public housing.
The World Bank wanted the government to
focus on what cannot be done by private indi-
viduals, such as legalisation, overall planning
and the provision of technical and social
infrastructure (Sakr, 1990: 6). But the govern-
ment was, according to Sakr (1990: 7), not
convinced by this approach. The government
was worried that legalisation and upgrading
projects would encourage new informal areas,
and it was also reluctant to abandon its highly
visible public housing projects for less visible
upgrading projects.
Forty years after the publication of the
Abt report, the idea that urban Egypt can be
divided into the formal and informal is more
powerful than ever despite its continued elu-
siveness. The announcement by the el-Sisi
state of the elimination of informality has
been accompanied by speculator acts of
destruction and construction of the built
environment and the passing of laws like the
Construction Violations and Reconciliation
Law. Despite all these actions, it remains
unclear what urban informality is for the
Egyptian state – its legal declarations could
(like the Abt study) constitute almost the
country’s entire urban-scape. But what
accounts for the tenacity of the elusive con-
cept of urban informality? Why did the
Egyptian state at first show little interest in
the concept of urban informality but by the
1990s become increasingly infatuated by it?
Militarising urban informality
In October 1992, an earthquake in Cairo
killed 561 people and injured thousands of
others, many of whom the government
reported to be living in precarious structures
(although this is disputed) (Florin, 2009).
The government was slow to respond to
those in need of assistance compared to
fleet-footed Islamic charities and groups
who were viewed by those in need and oth-
ers as far more effective in their provision of
assistance, including blankets, food, medi-
cine and shelter. The government did not
take kindly to the comparison with these
Islamic groups and tore down tents and
sabotaged other assistance that they pro-
vided (Napoli, 1993). Two months later, the
earthquake was followed by the infamous
siege of Imbaba, a working-class district in
Cairo. Al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya, a militant
Islamist group, had announced in a televised
news conference that it had established an
independent Islamic state in the area. The
government response was to seize the area –
with reports citing as many as 18,000 troops
– to ‘cleanse’ this community of the militant
Islamist group (Singerman, 2009).
Singerman (2009: 115) writes that the politi-
cal spectacle of the siege stigmatised infor-
mal housing areas:
The focus on the problems associated with
informal housing areas, and informality in
general, had been discussed in the media
before the siege, but after the siege the print
media highlighted a new disturbing link
between Islamists and informal housing areas
that evoked a sense of crisis, if not hysteria.
This spectacular use of force by the Egyptian
government in Imbaba and its intensified
focus on informal areas should be placed in
a context of increased anxiety in military
headquarters across the world over the
threat that urban areas posed to global secu-
rity. The siege of Imbaba was one urban
conflict among many in the 1990s that would
confirm to many military analysts and urban
studies scholars that warfare had been urba-
nised. The aftermath of 9/11 would further
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accelerate these trends. In 2003, Richard
Norton, a former commander in the US
Navy, penned his influential article on ‘feral
cities’ – defined as a metropolis with a popu-
lation of more than a million people but
where the government has lost the ability to
maintain the rule of law within the city’s
boundaries. These ‘feral cities’, Norton
argues, ‘exert an almost magnetic influence
on terrorist organizations’ (Norton, 2003:
98). Emphasis was placed on cities with large
Muslim populations, like Cairo, stressing
not only their size but their association with
militant Islamist groups. Even on the left,
scholars voiced similar concerns (see for
instance Davis’ (2004: 30) influential thesis
titled ‘Planet of slums’, where he detailed
how Islamist movements had become the
‘real government of the slums’). This body of
work took informal areas, the absence of
state-provided basic urban services and
physical infrastructure, as well as the infor-
mal economy to be key indicators of
ungovernability.
There was, however, thin evidence that
militant Islamist groups had a strong associ-
ation with the urban poor. The link with
Islamist groups to ‘informal areas’ in Egypt
was inevitable, with some definitions of
informality incorporating 90% of the coun-
try’s built environment. But more substan-
tially, Bayat (2007), in arguing directly
against Davis (2004) and others, noted that
in Egypt (and beyond) there is no obvious
link between the urban poor and militant
Islamism. He definitively showed, as the
empirical evidence has borne out, that
Islamic militancy does not have an ‘urban
ecology’. Furthermore, Bayat (2007) stressed
that politicians and the academic commu-
nity in Egypt viewed informal areas (or the
‘ashwai’yyat) through the prism of ‘slums’
formulated in the US where joblessness and
the decayed family structure are said to be
responsible for crime and violence; the areas
identified as ‘ashwai’yyat in Egypt did not
suffer from higher crime rates than other
areas and were home to a substantial num-
ber of middle-class urbanites (Bayat,
2007: 587–588). Despite the absence of any
substantive connection between the Islamic
military and areas identified as being infor-
mal, the siege of Imbaba provoked the
Mubarak regime to launch a plethora of
initiatives around areas it identified as infor-
mal, in order to combat ‘terrorism’.
While (as detailed above) urban informal-
ity had been discussed and studied amongst
government officials for well over a decade,
at the beginning of the 1990s the Egyptian
state in the context of the siege of Imbaba
‘discovered’ urban informality as an urgent
security issue to be confronted (Sims, 2010:
68). It was also in the 1990s that the term
‘ashwa’iyyat began to be used widely both in
official and popular discourse in Egypt.6 As
Bayat and Denis (2000: 197) note, ‘The ‘ash-
wa’iyyat are perceived as ‘‘abnormal’’ places
where, in modern conventional wisdom, the
‘‘non-modern’’ and thus ‘‘non-urban’’ peo-
ple, that is, the villagers, the traditionalists,
the non-conformists and the unintegrated,
live’. The central government in Egypt now
actively took the World Bank approach sug-
gested in the late 1970s and provided exten-
sive infrastructure and basic urban services
to areas it classified as informal. Notably,
police stations were an integral part of this
new infrastructural package (Sims, 2010).
Government control and surveillance were
increased but so were techniques to circum-
vent them, including the rise of an array of
middlemen – many of whom were govern-
ment officials (Haenni, 2009; Shawkat, 2020;
Sims, 2010). Haenni (2009) has argued that
the supposed effort at formalisation by the
Egyptian state actually created new forms of
informality. The state ‘manufactured’ ever
more layers in which a building could be
considered to be informal and ownership
rights became ever more precarious. The
appearance of the informal and formal
10 Urban Studies 00(0)
divide in Egypt became a state obsession but
it simultaneously resulted in the hazardisa-
tion of the built environment, creating ever
more complex knots, conflicts and negotia-
tions (haphazard urbanisation) over who
could live where and how.
In 2013, the military coup in Egypt that
brought el-Sisi to the Presidency meant a
deepening of the militarisation of the state
and its urban agenda (Khalil, 2019a: 96).
The el-Sisi era has been marked by the
hazardisation of the built environment that
has been accelerated and deepened by its
plans to ‘eliminate’ urban informality. The
el-Sisi state has placed concerted attention
on urban informality, I contend, because
this urban planning concept lies at the inter-
section of two perceived threats. The first is
the continued association by the Egyptian
state of Islamist violence with urban
agglomeration. The second is the perceived
threat that dense urban areas pose as a place
for people to gather to protest in the context
of the 25 January revolution. The 2011
Egyptian revolution was characterised by
urban revolt, and informal urban areas were
often identified and characterised by scho-
lars and journalists as being at the centre of
the mobilisation of the protest (Adham,
2016).
The period of the 2011 revolution was
marked by a notable assertion of the right to
the city (Sharp and Panetta, 2016). Urban
communities challenged in a highly visible
manner the organisation of the built envi-
ronment, such as constructing alternative
highway entrances and enacting their own
‘site and services’ projects. The appearance
of urban informality in this revolutionary
period was markedly changed and notably
targeted the rich and powerful, which had
previously not been thought possible.
Twenty-eight businessmen, controlling an
estimated 80% of land reclamation projects,
and several ministers were indicted for illegal
lands deals (Joya, 2011: 376). In February
2011, Ahmed El Maghrabi, the Housing
Minister from 2005 to 2010, was accused of
selling 113 acres of state-owned land in 6
October City (a so-called ‘desert city’ estab-
lished on the periphery of Cairo by former
President Anwar Sadat in 1979) to the
Akhbar al-Youm Investment Company to
develop middle-class housing. In 2015,
Maghrabi has acquitted of all charges, along
with nearly all of these cases, which were
dropped following the military coup in 2013
(Arese, 2018: 623). The top-down appear-
ance of urban informality – as one seemingly
demarked by the state and focused on the
urban poor – was restored.
It is through this political history of
urban informality, and its militarisation,
that the renewed war by el-Sisi to ‘eliminate’
urban informality should be comprehended.
In 2011, the Maspero neighbourhood of
Cairo, adjacent to Tahrir Square, gained a
reputation for being one of the most militant
areas – defending and directing protesters to
the square. The revolution had also sparked
residents into organising and demonstrating
against the state’s long-term attempts to dis-
place them (Wahba, 2020: 10). In late April
2018, the 77-acre Maspero Triangle site, an
area of prime and strategic real estate, was
dramatically turned to rubble. Khalil
(2019b), in her documentation of the strug-
gle between the people of Maspero and the
state, noted that ‘The Egyptian government
uses the term of ‘‘development of slums’’ to
describe its efforts to relocate residents,
which include forced evictions and the use of
security forces to remove the families’. The
state has declared its intention to turn this
district into a commercial and entertainment
hub financed supposedly through land sales
in this area. The rubble of Maspero and the
rows of military constructed and designed
public housing in Al-Asmarat on the periph-
ery of Cairo where many of the residents
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were rehoused provide a stark materialisa-
tion by the state of the formal and informal
urban divide.
Maspero and Al-Asmarat, however, while
directly impacting thousands of urban
Egyptians, do not impact the vast majority
of those placed under the various formula-
tions of informality. These definitive actions
by the state – that do indeed create a stark
divide between the formal and informal – are
not how most Egyptians experience inform-
ality. An example is the Construction
Violations Reconciliation Law, passed by
the Egyptian state in 2019 and amended in
2020, which aimed to solidify the appearance
of the formal and informal divide by legalis-
ing many buildings. The Built Environment
Observatory (BEO, 2020) has estimated that
this law has incorporated as many as 8.2 mil-
lion housing units built without a permit
since 2007 alone. But, as detailed by the
BEO, the ambitions of this law, despite being
declared by the machinery of the state, have
been met with all sorts of entanglements and
compromises: the municipalities did not have
the capacity to undertake such a large recon-
ciliation and have been largely reluctant to
impose it; the Engineers’ Syndicate tasked
with undertaking structural reports to con-
form to the law is too expensive for most;
the law is unpopular with owners of build-
ings; and there is a lack of clarity over who
should apply. The result is that instead of
the complete transformation of how prop-
erty is held by millions in the country (the
stated aim of the law), the law has resulted in
32,000 applications for reconciliation (BEO,
2020). Rather than organising the built envi-
ronment into a more durable appearance of
the formal and informal, another hazard has
been produced for urban Egyptians to navi-
gate in their quest for everyday survival.
The rubble of Maspero and the lines of
public housing in Al-Asmarat are the excep-
tional instances in which the formal and
informal divide has (at least superficially)
been made to appear. The vast majority of
Egyptians live in a haphazard urban context
in which there is a constant negotiation over
where Egyptians can and cannot live, and
what is formal and informal. The thousands
upon thousands of empty apartments in the
desert cities are just one testament to this
(detailed in Shawkat, 2020; Sims, 2010,
2015). The way in which urban informality
by the state can result in the hazardisation
of urban life rather than the neat determina-
tion of what is informal and what is not has
also been articulated in the state’s struggle
to impose its definition of informality. The
state does not act in a power vacuum; there
are struggles within it and beyond over the
placement of urban life.
The example of the resistance by residents
of al-Warraq Island against the Egyptian
state imposing its definition of urban inform-
ality on inhabitants is an illustration of how
this category can be unsettled. The Egyptian
state announced that it planned to turn al-
Warraq Island in the Giza district of Cairo
into a tourist destination and expropriate the
land, planning to evict the estimated 120,000
people that inhabit the island (Arabic
Network for Human Rights Information
[ANHRI], 2018). Notably, the economic via-
bility of turning this island into a tourist des-
tination and of moving its inhabitants, and
the substantive interest of (Gulf) investors to
invest in such a project, are all unknown.
The government, according to the Arab
Network for Human Rights Information
(ANHRI) who conducted field visits with
the island residents, reported that inhabi-
tants informed them that the state had pre-
vented food supplies reaching the island, had
cut off water and had accused them of
belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood. The
residents mobilised into committees repre-
senting the families living on the island to
maintain their presence there, running
Facebook pages and doing interviews on
BBC Arabic and other news channels.
12 Urban Studies 00(0)
In July 2017, the government began tearing
down houses while families remained inside,
leading to among the first notable instances
of violence between the protesters and the
state since the 2011 revolution and the death
of a 26-year-old man, Sayed Hassan Al-
Gezawy (ANHRI, 2018; Khalil, 2019a: 106).
The police and military had reportedly
planned to demolish 720 houses but withdrew
following protests by the island inhabitants
after five houses had been destroyed (Bassam,
2018: 3). The battle for control of the island
between the state and the islanders continues,
as the state carries on its attempts to transfer
100,000 residents from the island to one of its
public housing complexes. In December 2020,
the state sentenced 35 of the protesters to
prison and hard labour and restated its inten-
tion to displace the residents of the island (Al-
Muhandis, 2020). Like much of urban Egypt,
the struggle continues between the residents
of Al-Warraq Island, various factions of the
state and business interests. Khalil (2019a:
107) notes that the violence caused by forced
evictions is not only limited to al-Warraq but
has also occurred in many other governorates.
The appearance of the formal and informal
divide is a central concept in these struggle.
The wrestling over the formal and informal
urban divide is resulting in the hazardisation
of urban life.
Conclusion
Debates over what urban informality is con-
tinue to rage not only within and beyond the
state in Egypt but also in the pages of scho-
larly journals. Several recent articles have
called for urban studies to: ‘transcend urban
informality’ (Acuto et al., 2019); understand
urban informality as a ‘site of critical analy-
sis’ (Banks et al., 2020) or as ‘splintered’
(Beier, 2021); consider ‘informality as a con-
dition’ (Marx and Kelling, 2019); or think of
alternatives, like ‘popular urbanization’
(Streule et al., 2020). In this article, I have
not argued for a more precise or fixed defini-
tion of urban informality or called for alter-
native formulations to it, but for scholars
and policy makers to be attentive to the
political processes through which this uncer-
tain yet powerful concept is produced.
Through a critical reading of the Abt report
that first introduced the language of inform-
ality, I illustrated the arbitrary way in which
much of urban Egypt was classified as infor-
mal. Despite the fact that this study detailed
a range of haphazard urban practices, it
insisted that urban Egypt was divided into
the formal and informal. I in turn high-
lighted the geopolitical shifts and motiva-
tions that underlie the appearance of urban
informality. Urban Egypt, I contend, is char-
acterised by haphazard urbanisation, consti-
tuted by complex urban struggles, in which
it takes the mobilisation of notable power to
produce the appearance of a formal and
informal divide and make it durable.
My approach to urban informality is one
that does not understand it to be an object
or a mode of urbanisation that is central to
the territorial practices of state power. In
tracing the Egyptian state’s engagement with
urban informality, I highlighted how the
state showed great reluctance in engaging
this framework, until it was framed as a
threat and subsequently militarised in the
1990s. Urban informality is now viewed by
the el-Sisi regime as a central threat to the
state but this has not meant that it has been
able to dictate the appearance of urban
informality. Rather, it has at times resulted
in deadly struggles and what I term the
hazardising of collective life in the country,
making the achievement of a just, beautiful
and sustainable city life ever more difficult
in the country.
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1. Egypt Vision 2030. Available at: https://
egypt2030.gov.eg/?lang=en (accessed December
2020); Egyptian Ministry of Defence, A Smile
of Hope, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
uvPajn_BIKs (accessed December 2020).
2. Translation by the author.
3. Hazard as a noun means a danger or risk; for
example, the hazards of urban life. It can also
mean chance and probability, an English
meaning that might have derived from the
Arabic al-zahr (meaning ‘dice’).
4. Roy (2005) understands the term mode to
mean a manner, form or method.
5. Notably, the Abt study report incorrectly
cited Law 52 of 1940 as ‘Law 52 of 1940 and
1975’.
6. According to Shawkat (2020: 44), Decree 75/
1990 marks the first time the term ‘ash-
wa’iyyat was used in legislation to describe
informal areas. The Informal Settlements
Development Facility (ISDF), as it is known
in English, is officially named in Arabic ‘The
‘Ashwa’iyyat District Development Fund’.
The 2014 constitution commits the state in
Article 78 to create a ‘strong and complete
plan’ to ‘face the ‘ashwa’iyyat problem’.
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